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The study of collective action requires an understanding of the individual incentives and 
of the institutional constraints that guide people in making choices about cooperating or 
defecting on the group facing the dilemma. The use of local ecosystems by groups of individuals 
is just one example where individual extraction increases well-being, but aggregate extraction 
decreases it. The use of economic experiments has enhanced the already diverse knowledge from 
theoretical and field sources of when and how groups can solve the problem through self-
governing mechanisms. These studies have identified several factors that promote and limit 
collective action, associated with the nature of the production system that allows groups to 
benefit from a joint-access local ecosystem, and associated with the institutional incentives and 
constraints from both self-governed and externally imposed rules. In general, there is widespread 
agreement that cooperation can happen and be chosen by individuals as a rational strategy, 
beyond the ￿tragedy of the commons￿ prediction. A first step in this paper is to propose a set of 
layers of information that the individuals might be using to decide over their level of 
cooperation. The layers range from the material incentives that the specific production function 
imposes, to the dynamics of the game, to the composition of the group and the individual 
characteristics of the player. We next expand the experimental literature by analyzing data from 
a set of experiments conducted in the field with actual ecosystem users in three rural villages of 
Colombia using this framework.  We find that repetition brings reciprocity motives into the 
decision making.  Further, prior experience of the participants, their perception of external 
regulation, or the composition of the group in terms of their wealth and social position in the 
village, influence decisions to cooperate or defect in the experiment. The results suggest that 
understanding the multiple levels of the game, in terms of the incentives, the group and 
individual characteristics or the context, can help understand and therefore explore the potentials 
for solving the collective-action dilemma. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The use of local ecosystems by human groups through different farming and extractive 
systems involves the resolution of collective-action problems due to (1) the nature of interactions 
between individuals and the ecosystem and (2) the nature of the institutions that govern the rights 
and duties of those affected by the goods and services provided by these ecosystems. 
Understanding how individuals within groups make decisions about their use of the ecosystems, 
and how self-governed solutions at the group level can emerge that enhance sustainable use over 
time, are both crucial for the possibilities of a sustained management of the local commons. The 
use of economic experiments for addressing these questions was pioneered a decade ago by 
Ostrom et al. (1994). In the current paper, we take a further step and explore the possibilities of 
conducting these economic experiments in the field, with actual users of local ecosystems, in 
order to learn about their decision making in such settings. 
Contemporary economic theory is one of the more successful, empirically verified, social 
science theories to explain human behavior.  It does best, however, in the settings for which it 
was developed￿the exchange of private goods and services in an open, competitive market.  
The theory is based on a theory of goods, an institutional mechanism, and a model of human 
behavior. When the goods involved are easily excludable and rivalrous, and individuals are 
interacting in a competitive market, theoretical predictions have strong empirical support.  When 
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the goods involved are not easy to exclude￿public goods or common-pool resources, for 
example￿empirical support for conventional theoretical predictions receives much less 
empirical support (Camerer 1997, 1998; Gintis 2000).  In a static setting, the conventional 
predictions are that individuals will not produce public goods and that they will overharvest 
common-pool resources.  The evidence for both predictions is mixed (Ostrom 1999). 
In public good experiments, for example, instead of contributing nothing to the provision 
of a public good, as is predicted by neoclassical theory for individuals maximizing material 
payoffs, individuals tend to contribute, on average, between 40 to 60 percent of their 
experimentally assigned assets in a one-shot game (Davis and Holt 1993; Isaac and Walker 
1988b).  In repeated games, the average level of contribution starts at around 50 percent but, 
without opportunities for communication, slowly decays toward the predicted zero level 
(Ledyard 1995).  With non-binding communication￿cheap talk￿subjects are able to sustain 
cooperation in public good experiments for long periods of time (Sally 1995; Isaac and Walker 
1988a).  Similarly, subjects in common-pool resource experiments approach near-optimal 
withdrawal levels when they are able to communicate, come to their own agreements, and use 
agreed-upon punishments if someone deviates from the agreement (Ostrom et al., 1994). 
Probably the clearest rejections of theoretical predictions have occurred in ultimatum and 
dictator experiments where first movers tend to offer second movers a far larger share of the 
bounty than predicted and where second movers (when given a chance) turn down offers that are 
not perceived, given the experimental conditions, as being fair (see G￿th and Tietz 1990; Roth 
1995). 
Field studies also find that the theoretical prediction that users are trapped in inexorable 




though many examples exist of resources that have been destroyed through overuse.  Achieving 
effective, self-organized solutions is, of course, not a guaranteed outcome.  Attributes of 
resources and of participants have consistently been found to affect initial levels of organization 
(Gibson et al. 2000; Ostrom 2001).  Social scientists interested in human-resource dynamics face 
a major challenge to construct a behavioral theory of human behavior that includes the classical 
economic model when applied to the exchange of private goods in full-information, market 
settings, but that assumes a wider range of motivations when individuals use resource systems 
that are non-private goods (Hirschmann 1985). The theory needs to encompass a full array of 
goods, a broader model of the individual (including the types of norms adopted by individuals), 
the importance of group characteristics, the possibilities for using reputation and reciprocity, and 
the specific rules used in particular settings.  Given the number of variables involved, providing 
a framework for how they are interlinked is one of the most important next steps toward a new 
theoretical synthesis.   
In this paper, we take a small step in this direction.  We speculate that understanding how 
individuals learn about and interpret the information potentially available to them in a particular 
situation is an important factor affecting their decisions.  We thus offer a simple framework for 
studying how individuals gather information about the incentives of a situation, the context of 
the group in which they face the dilemma, as well as information about themselves.  We posit 
that these layers of information are differentially invoked by the structure of a situation to inform 
the decision on whether to cooperate or defect when facing such options within a group 
immersed in a local commons problem. 
We illustrate the usefulness of the framework to explain behavior in a series of field 




experiments about their perceptions and values related to the layers of the framework) enables us 
to explain a significant part of the variation in cooperation, as a function of variables associated 
with various levels of individual and group information in the game. 
Most experimental studies that use information elicited by participants on their personal 
data have focused mostly on basic demographics like gender, age, or education, but rarely do 
these studies associate behavior in the experiments to the participants￿ actual experience on the 
kinds of phenomena being studied in the experimental design. Examples of exceptions are 
Cooper et al. (1999) where the experimenters invite actual Chinese managers to participate in a 
decision-making environment on planning and management in firms. Also, Karlan (2003) ran 
experiments and correlated trust and cooperation on repayment of actual microcredits in Peru. As 
for the case of common-pool resource experiments, we have to date no knowledge of 
experiments conducted with actual resource users and where the subjects￿ context is used to 
explain variation in experimental behavior. 
 
2.  THE LAYERS OF INFORMATION THAT PEOPLE BRING INTO THE GAME 
 
Institutions as ￿rules of the game￿ transform key elements involved in the decision of an 
individual. Most of these elements enter the decision as information￿or lack of it￿about 
components of the game or other participants in the game. Individuals, by interacting with 
institutions, gather information by learning about others and their actions, and about the 
consequences of interacting within a specific set of rules.  
Our framework, first proposed in CÆrdenas (2000), combines inputs from Ostrom￿s 
(1998) behavioral model of collective action, from Bowles￿s (1998) arguments for a model of 




exchange (see Figure 1).  The arguments are associated with the specific kinds of information 
that are available to members from the same rural village who hold information about each other, 
and information about the context in which the social interactions happen in the experiment or in 
































Ostrom (1998, 2000) argues that studying the context of a game is crucial because 
institutions affect individuals￿ decisions to cooperate by performing at least three key tasks. First, 
institutions reinforce social norms that are consistent with the rules. Second, they allow 
participants to gather more or less information about the behavior of others. And third, they 
entitle people to reward and punish certain behaviors with material and non-material incentives.  
The framework organizes the kinds of information that individuals may use in deciding 
whether to cooperate or defect in a collective-action problem.  As a starting point, let us assume 
that an individual is facing a game with the characteristics of a particular collective-action 
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Pareto-optimal solution is achieved at universal cooperation. However, it is frequently observed 
that a significant fraction of individuals (roughly half) start cooperating in these experiments 
(Ledyard 1995). Arguments explaining this range from presuming a lack of learning and 
understanding of the game to inherited altruistic preferences of humans. Assuming that 
individuals engage in reciprocity is also offered as an explanation in repeated games.  
Information enables players to decide whether to trust the others in the group and cooperate, 
once they are aware that cooperation can achieve a Pareto-superior outcome. 
The framework we propose classifies the pieces of information that the players gather to explain 
how players may transform the material payoffs of an externally defined game into an internal 
game. These data can be ordered in three layers of information, namely, the Material Payoffs 
Game layer, the Group-Context layer, and the Identity layer. We argue that players use these 
layers of information as sources for responding to questions like the following:  
Layer  Basic Questions of Participants 
Material Payoffs 
Game 
What material payoffs can I obtain from my actions and those of others in 
this game? What can I learn from previous rounds of this same game? What 
can happen in future rounds of this game because of what happens in 
previous rounds? 
Group-Context  Who are the others in my group? Can they be trusted? Do they usually 
cooperate in this and similar games? Do they follow social norms? 
Identity  Do I care if I defect on others? Do I enjoy cooperating? Or competing? Does 
my experience in similar games provide hints on how to play this game? 
 
These layers of information can be expressed in the framework shown in Figure 1, which 
provides examples of specific factors included in each of the layers that transform the game from 
an external, material payoffs game into an internal game.  Our framework implies that 
individuals try to gather and evaluate information about these three layers, depending on the 




players, net individual and group gains may be achieved from gathering additional information, 
even if costly, to construct a new internal game. The transformed game will then have a different 
set of payoffs, a different set of preferred strategies, and eventually, in light of the change of 
behavior over time, a different set of Nash strategies. Depending on the initial distribution of 
intrinsic preferences and the information revealed, social dilemma games may be transformed 
into other games, such as an assurance game, with less conflict between individual and collective 
interest. The new internal game does not have to be a monotonic transformation of the initial 
material payoffs structure in the static one-shot game. 
Given these possibilities, let us now look at the layers of information proposed in the 
framework. 
a.  The Material Payoffs Game Layer 
In the first layer of information, the player observes the structure of material payoffs and 
feasible strategies for a one-shot game. The set of actions and payoffs will produce possible Nash 
equilibria, some of which may be more socially desirable than others. The valuation of the game 
at this layer is affected by common knowledge of the set of formal rules that are effectively 
enforced and that impose material costs or benefits on each decision. Therefore, the perceived 
game drawing on this information is in fact the one resulting after applying those formal rules 
and the material rewards, penalties, or restrictions that are fully enforced. Once the enforcement 
of rules suffers from any kind of transaction or enforcement costs, the other layers of information 
enter into play to affect the actual response to a certain formal but partially enforced rule.  
Further, most social exchange relations of the collective-action type in the field involve a 
non-zero probability of facing the same counterparts in future rounds of the game.  Axelrod￿s 




grounds. The likelihood that the same players meet in future rounds creates several effects in the 
dynamic game. Since players can learn and have memory, they can build a reputation and build a 
history of the reputation built by others. McCabe and Smith (2003), in their cognitive model, 
suggest a set of modules, one of which involves the process of goodwill accounting. Since the 
strategy of tit-for-tat produces strong results in the long run against most other strategies, the 
information that can be gathered about past rounds and the probability of future ones with the 
same players creates the conditions that are conducive for cooperation through reciprocity, 
including retaliation towards non-cooperators as a group selection mechanism. It is well 
recognized that in public good experiments with no possibilities for communication among 
players, contributions decrease over rounds. Players who start cooperating, but observe others 
free-riding, decrease their cooperation. This phenomenon of crowding-out of cooperative 
behavior (see CÆrdenas et al. 2000 for more details) will play a crucial role in the empirical 
results we present below. It may also explain why one observes cases in the field where initial 
cooperative efforts fail after a period of time because cooperators, frustrated by the initial free-
riding of others, switch to non-cooperative behavior. The argument behind the crowding-out 
hypothesis is that the intrinsic motivations (see Frey and Jegen, forthcoming, for a survey) can be 
crowded-out by explicit incentives such as rewards or sanctions because the intrinsic motivation 
can work in opposite direction than the material incentive within the internal rewards the player 
gets from each. 
The time frame is also important. Isaac et al. (1994) explored extending the number of 
rounds in a linear public goods game from 10 to 40 and 60 rounds and show how while in 10 
rounds the percentage of contributions falls from 50% to less than 10%, when ran over 40 
rounds, by the 10




only by the 40
th round. When extending to 60 rounds the same pattern happens, namely, starting 
at 50% contributions, at 30% by round 40, and around 10% by round 60. This pattern would be 
consistent with the behavioral model of the rational actor of Ostrom (1998) where longer time 
horizons can contribute to the virtuous cycle of reciprocity, trust, and reputation that sustain 
cooperation. 
b.  The Group-Context Layer 
A second information layer is proposed on the notion that a player￿s decisions are also 
influenced by recognizing specifically who the other players are in the transaction.  Knowing 
who the others in a game are may trigger the possibility that the same players will meet in a 
future round of the game. The possibility of reciprocity and retaliation processes affects future 
outcomes. Secondly, an individual￿s own set of preferences may include caring for the well-
being of certain others (relatives, friends, or neighbors), and knowing who is involved affects 
their valuation for the payoffs going to others. 
For repeated games, evolutionary models￿where the gains from cooperating or 
defecting may be affected by the frequency of cooperators and defectors in the group (Bowles 
1998)￿also provide grounds for this argument. The information a player has about the 
composition of the group will determine if there is sufficient trust among those involved to 
choose to cooperate for mutual gains. Thus, depending on the fraction of trustworthy and 
opportunistic types observed in a group, the player will have a better estimate of the likelihood of 
cooperation by others and therefore of the gains and costs of doing likewise.  
Empirical evidence supports this. Group identity, group cohesion, and social distance 
have been shown to affect the likelihood that individuals cooperate.  Lawler and Yoon (1996), 




increased the frequency of mutual agreements.  Kollock (1998) provides data from a set of 
prisoner￿s dilemma experiments studying how group identity has a direct effect on cooperative 
behavior. The behavior of college students changed depending on the information they received 
about the other players (being from the same fraternity, from any other fraternity, from the same 
campus, from another campus, from the police department).  Significant changes in behavior 
were found consistent with the existence of strong in-group/out-group effects (see Orbell et al. 
1988). Other non-experimental evidence might also support how group composition and context 
may determine cooperation. Alesina and La Ferrara (1999) show evidence from U.S. survey data 
that the participation of individuals in social organizations and activities is higher for more equal 
and less fragmented localities in terms of race or ethnicity. Group heterogeneity and inequality 
are still presented to be part of the core explanations for collective action since Olson (1965) and, 
more recently, with Bergstrom et al. (1986).   
Accounting for the particular major of the student participating has also been a focus of 
attention. Early experiments in the 1980s asked whether economics majors showed higher levels 
of free-riding with modest strong results (Marwell and Ames 1981; Isaac et al. 1985, reported in 
Ledyard 1995).  More recently, Cadsby and Maynes (1998) reported that nurses showed higher 
levels of cooperation than economics and business students in a threshold public goods game. 
These results would also be consistent with the work by Frank et al. (1993) on the behavior of 
economics majors being closer to game-theoretical predictions.  In another interesting study, 
Ockenfels and Weinmann (1999) found that East German participants behaved less 
cooperatively than West German ones in both public goods (ten rounds, 5 person) and solidarity 




We are not claiming that groups that are homogeneous and closed to their outside 
environment are always more prone to cooperation. There are many other factors in the 
technology of the collective action and their relative position within that technology that can 
affect their willingness to cooperate. Further, different types of heterogeneity can act in ways 
opposite to the homogeneity → cooperation causality. Some evidence indicates that groups that 
are closer to markets, and less homogeneous in race or cultural identity, can in fact show high 
levels of trust and cooperative behavior. Our experiment suggests that heterogeneity in wealth 
and social position within a group imposes a barrier to finding self-governed solutions to the 
cooperation dilemma (see also CÆrdenas 2003). Certainly, a long history of lack of cooperation 
within a homogeneous group can also impose a considerable barrier to future cooperation.  
Unfortunately, time frames of experiments are too limited to study such long-term processes. 
Much of the arguments for heterogeneity inducing higher cooperation are based on the 
asymmetric payoffs structure where the players with higher stakes may be more willing to 
provide the public good.  We would assign such effects to the static game layer in the 
framework.  However, other elements arising from group composition may also enter into play 
even under a symmetric payoff. One of these cases is the effect that social differences may have 
in a group￿for instance, due to wealth. For a more detailed discussion on how wealth 
differences may have an effect in solving these dilemmas see CÆrdenas (2003). 
c.  The Identity Layer 
In this third layer, the players store and process information about their own selves that 
may affect subjective payoffs and thus strategies chosen. Values internal to the player will 
increase or decrease the subjective payoffs from cooperating or defecting because of the 




invoked by a particular game.  The information is already available.  It is used depending on the 
externalities involved in the game. In the case of transactions under perfectly competitive 
markets where no externalities are involved, it is unlikely that the player will use this layer.  
Positing this layer is consistent with Sen￿s (1977) rejection of egoism and opportunism as 
the only rationalities possible for humans. His discussion of behaviors based on sympathy￿
which is still based on an egoist rationality￿may help to explain why we observe non-negative 
voluntary contributions in public goods.  Also, inherently human traits such as reciprocal fairness 
(Fehr and Tyran 1997; Kahneman et al. 1986) create behavior that goes against the opportunist 
prediction. Falk et al. (2002) explore behavior in the commons based on the theoretical model 
proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). They include individual preferences based on reciprocity 
and fairness to explain the levels of cooperation in experiments where communication and 
informal sanctioning are introduced (see also Crawford and Ostrom 1995). In their model, an 
individual￿s utility increases with material payoffs, but decreases with the level of 
disadvantageous or advantageous inequality in outcomes. This kind of other-regarding 
preferences model still maintains a utility maximizing rationality, but one that is based not only 
on one￿s payoffs but also on the others￿ outcomes. Therefore, the material payoffs game is 
transformed, not necessarily in a monotonic manner, after considering the outcomes of others. 
An example is the pleasure or joy one has from cooperating or defecting, depending on one￿s 
values or preferences about being the best, or observing how the group does well.  
This identity layer is also quite important when imperfect information exists about the 
material game (payoffs, strategies, and other players). Past experience in similar games, skills, 
and education can inform the player about the game. For instance, the framing of the problem 




exact same objective structures produce different behavior depending on the framing (Hoffman 
et al, 1996, 1999). Institutions in field settings can induce different preferences in the way that 
they frame a social exchange situation. Although the econometric analysis and data will not 
allow for testing specifically the weights of others￿ well-being in the transformed payoffs of each 
player in our experiment, the findings will be consistent with the literature just mentioned of why 
we could find in the field and the experimental lab behavior that is rationally cooperative within 
these settings. 
The two-way arrows above the layers in Figure 1 suggest that cross-effects between 
layers might play a role as well. The conditions of one layer may reinforce or diminish the effect 
of another layer. Sally (2001) has proposed a formal model to introduce the concept of sympathy 
as a key to determining the willingness to cooperate by a player. He defines sympathy as the 
￿fellow-feeling person i has for person j￿ and models it as a function of both the physical and 
psychological distances between i and j. His approach, using our framework, combines the last 
two layers in the sense that it involves information both about self and about the others when 
playing the game.  In fact, Sally differentiates sympathy from altruism. He uses a reciprocity 
argument for the former, since persons will reduce their fellow-feeling for another when they 
feel they are being taken advantage of. In general, the importance of cross-effects among the 
factors that determine cooperation has been understudied, particularly in experiments.  Ledyard 
(1995, p. 144), in fact, mentions the lack of research on this area, on how the marginal effect of 
one variable depends on the level of another institutional variable. He cites the work by Isaac and 
Walker (1988b) and Isaac et al. (1994) on how the effect of the marginal per capita returns 




suggests that the static game layer￿where the MPCR determines the material marginal return 
from contributions￿might interact with the group composition layer. 
d.  Hypotheses about Decision Making using this Framework  
If the arguments presented above about the advantages of using the framework are valid, 
we could further explore why substantial differences are observed in behavior, under the same 
experimental design, when comparing different cultures. For example, Henrich (2000) and 
Henrich et al. (2001) report on a series of ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games from field 
experiments with 15 small-scale societies in 12 countries. The behavior under the same objective 
game varied with the culture of the group as well as with results obtained in experimental labs 
using American undergraduate students. 
Individuals decide to gather information or not from added layers beyond the basic game 
layer depending on the overall structure of the game, including the payoffs, the feasible 
strategies, the other players, and the norms and rules that are shared by such groups. Bringing 
this information to the game depends on the ease and cost of gathering it.  If players do not know 
who the others are in the group involved in a social dilemma transaction, the Group-Context 
layer is useless for them, unless this is inexpensive information to gather. If the player does not 
assume multiple rounds of the same game with the same players, there is no need about multiple 
time periods and implications related to reciprocity.
  In fact, Bowles suggests that ￿the more the 
experimental situation approximates a competitive (and complete contracts) market with 
anonymous buyers and sellers, the less other-regarding behavior will be observed￿ (1998, p. 89). 
A case in which a player might want to bring information from other layers into the game 
is when a transaction involves some kind of externality or interdependency not corrected in the 




being of others in the group. A Prisoner￿s Dilemma game is the typical case, although not the 
only one. If possible, every player would like to gather more information to better predict the 
other player￿s action and then use it along with elements like caring for the other to choose 
whether to cooperate or not.  
A second reason for the player to search for information in other layers is the existence of 
asymmetric information and the costliness of writing and enforcing contracts.  Many social 
exchange transactions involve some kind of private information that gives the player the 
possibility of deriving extra rents from the transaction. In common-pool resources, it would be 
very costly for other users or authorities to know the individual levels of appropriation that 
decrease the availability of the resource for others. 
In summary, we suggest that when the game involves externalities and there are problems 
of asymmetric information among players, they will search for additional information from one 
or more of the three layers and use these to create an internalized vision of the game. Some will 
be more likely to cooperate because of this information, while others will be more likely to 
defect. The internal game values will be affected by their perception of self (Identity layer), the 
information they gather about the other players (Group-Context layer), and the dynamic game 
conditions. The basic structure of the game in the static game layer alone will not provide the 
complete picture, but players may try to complement it with the other layers of information if 
they can. 
 
3.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM FIELD LABS 
 
The second and third layers￿Group-Context and Identity￿are especially related to the 




pointed out. Experimenters usually try to downplay the importance of culture, beliefs, group 
identity, social context, and personal identity in the way they design experiments. The 
importance of these factors in forming the context of the basic game gives support for the 
methodological tactic we present, i.e., to bring the experimental lab to the field and enrich the 
analysis that Ledyard has identified as important but difficult. 
An adaptation of the initial design for common-pool resource games established in 
Ostrom et al. (1994) was brought to three Colombian villages. All three rural communities had 
joint access to a resource and the respective groups all faced a common-pool resource dilemma. 
In one case, the shared ecosystem was a mangrove forest where they extracted mollusks, 
firewood, and fisheries. In another case, villagers extracted fibers from nearby forests for 
handcrafting activities and firewood, which affected the state of the forest and the conservation 
of water supply in the watershed. In the third case, the villagers obtained wild meat from hunting 
and firewood from the local forests. In all three cases, the forests were either state or private 
reserves, but exclusion was difficult due to weak state enforcement mechanisms and political 
conflict. In another study (CÆrdenas 2001), using part of the data reported here, it is shown how 
the actual experience (measured through labor allocated to the actual extraction of these 
resources) explains variation in cooperation in the experiments. Below we will explore how this 
and other factors associated with the individual, group, and village context can play a role in 
explaining experimental behavior. Eventually, if the results are externally valid, this will increase 
our understanding of individual behavior in collective-action situations. 
Let us now focus on the experimental design. Fifteen sessions (groups), with eight people 
each, were conducted within the same basic design where players had to choose an individual 




The baseline design of the field experiment is as follows:  Participants were told that they 
would participate in a group of eight people in the same room, in a game where they had to 
choose privately the number of times (e.g., months per year) they would go to a forest to extract 
a resource (e.g., firewood). Their earnings from such decision would depend not only on their 
individual extraction but also on the extraction levels that the other members of their group made 
in that round.  
Participants could know the earnings in a round by looking at a payoff table where the 
columns represented the player￿s choice of ￿months in the forest,￿ from 0 to 8 units; the rows of 
the table represented the sum of ￿months in the forest￿ by the other seven players of the group. 
The cells in the table had the monetary payoffs for such combination of one￿s choice and the sum 
of choices of the others in that group. The payoff function was constructed in such a manner that 
we created a typical common-pool resource dilemma where individual extractions increased 
personal gains, but aggregate extractions decreased everyone￿s gains. In each round, each player 
would learn from the experimenter the total extraction level by all eight players.  From such 
number, each could calculate their earnings by using the payoffs table. Detailed instructions 
(translation) and the payoffs table are appended to this paper.  
The data used here consists of a set of common-pool resource experiments conducted in 
the summer of 1998, where roughly 180 campesinos participated in a series of repeated-rounds 
sessions under different treatments. We asked each participant to fill out a survey at the end of 
each session￿information that we were able to link to their decisions in the field lab for the 
analysis of individual and group contexts.  
The framing of the decision making was that each participant had to decide how to 




structure in these common-pool resource dilemmas was that each participant￿s earnings 
increased with their own time in the forest, but decreased with the group￿s total time in the 
forest. The key payoff benchmarks were the social optimum, where every player harvests from 
the forest for only one month, yielding Col$645 (US$0.50) in each round; and the Nash 
equilibrium, where everyone would harvest for six months yielding a suboptimal result of 
Col$155 (US$0.12) per round, i.e., around 24% of the maximum social efficiency possible. For 
18 rounds, each participant would earn around Col$2,790 (about US$2.15) if they followed the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy. If all participants played the social optimum strategy, 
however, each could earn Col$11,610 (about US$8.9). The daily minimum wage was around 
US$5.40 at the time for all three villages.
3 Depending on the treatment, our participants each 
earned somewhere between US$5 to $7 for their participation, which was paid at the end of each 
session, in person and confidentially. They also received a show-up fee represented in certain 
items for their household with an average value of around US$2. Under these incentives, we 
expected participants to be compensated for their opportunity cost of coming to the sessions, 
which took about half a day total for each participant. 
All fifteen groups of eight people in the sample participated in a no-communication 
treatment for nine rounds, at which point they were told that a new set of rules was to be 
introduced in the game. Five of these groups, which we will label REG, were told after the first 
stage ended that an external regulation would attempt to improve the group￿s earnings, while the 
other ten groups, which we will label COM, were allowed to have a face-to-face group 
discussion before each round to comment openly about the game developments. Each group, 
                                                 




therefore, went through a no-communication stage to a single new treatment institution, but no 
group had to face both communication and regulation. 
In the case of the external regulation design, the participants were informed before 
beginning the new rounds under this rule, that playing one month in the forest would yield 
payoffs at the social optimum and that to achieve such an outcome, an inspector (the monitor) 
would randomly audit one of the players with a probability of 1/16 in each round. If the player 
had chosen two or more months in the forest, he or she would have a penalty of Col$100 
(U.S.$0.08) imposed for each month in excess.  These points would be subtracted from the final 
earnings. However, those under the communication treatment were never told of a solution to the 
dilemma, i.e., that each player had to choose one month as their group maximizing strategy. 
Nevertheless, and as we will show later on, at the end of the second stage, the groups under 
communication were in fact achieving group results closer to the social optimum solution than 
those groups under the external regulation which in fact was devised, indicated, and monitored 
from outside of the group. 
For purposes of the analysis of these experiments, we calculated the individual deviation 
from the predicted Nash strategy (in months in the forest) and used this measure as a proxy for 
cooperation.  Figure 2 illustrates changes in this dependent variable over the set of rounds in both 




















During the first stage, behavior in both the REG and COM designs is very similar.  This 
similarity lends support to our interpretation that the substantial differences in the second stage 
result from the difference in incentives introduced by external regulation versus face-to-face 
communication.   
 
The difference in outcomes during the second stage of the experiment cannot be 
explained by the monetary payoffs alone.  In the case of external regulation, the expected cost of 
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intended to induce an improvement of social efficiency and, therefore, individual 
monetary outcomes. An improvement did, in fact, happen in the early rounds after external 
regulation was introduced. By the third round of the second stage of the experiments with 
external regulation, however, the gains were rapidly eroded. Selfish behavior, along with an 
imperfect monitoring, created more overharvesting, even when compared to the rounds prior to 
the introduction of the rule. These results are discussed in more detail in CÆrdenas et al. (2000). 
In the case of the groups under face-to-face communication, we found the results 
consistent with the earlier evidence in a university experimental lab (Ostrom et al. 1994). Despite 
agreements being non-binding, face-to-face communication did create and sustain, on average, a 
more cooperative behavior among players, thus increasing social efficiency. However, a wide 
variation in decisions and outcomes existed when looking at the individual data within and 
across groups.  
The survey that we conducted at the end of the sessions included information about basic 
demographic variables such as gender, age, education; economic activities, assets, and 
occupation; as well as personal opinions about the role of government and community 
governance structures. In order to test for the combined effects of some of the factors discussed 
in the layers of the model, we used a regression analysis model in which we attempted to explain 
the individual level of cooperation in each round as a function of vectors of variables from all the 
layers, thanks to the round-level data from the experiment, the individual-level data we gathered 
about the participants, and the construction of group-level data for each of the eight player 
groups. Thus, each observation in the regression corresponds to the decision by one player in a 




As the dependent variable of this multivariate analysis, we have again chosen to measure 
the degree of deviation away from the predicted Nash strategy for each player as our measure of 
cooperation. The closer to the Nash strategy of material payoffs maximization as a best response 
to the others, the lower the degree of cooperation. We will call this variable XDEVIA and have 
calculated it as the difference between the Nash best response and the actual choice in that round. 
A major reason to choose this proxy for cooperation is that the typical common-pool resource 
experiment does not have a dominant strategy in game-theoretical terms. In our case, the Nash 
strategy changes depending on the level of extraction by the other players. With our proxy, we 
can make comparable different levels of extraction regardless of the extraction of the others. 
Notice that the estimation of XDEVIA depends on the sum of months by the rest of the group, 
which each player did not know with certainty. We tested the estimations with two options 
yielding equivalent results: one with the sum of months in the same round, and one with the sum 
of months in the previous round. A quick observation of the distribution of XDEVIA over 
rounds, for all rounds before and after the new rule, shows that less than 6% of choices were in 
the negative range and less than 1% were values of -3 units or more. All positive values meant 
strategies that were, at least, in the best response level or lower than that. 
The independent variables for the estimation were: 
DELTAVG7:  Change (average reduction) in ￿months in the forest￿ by the other seven players in the 
group. This was calculated as the (∑ months by the other 7 players in t-1 ) - ∑ months in t.  
This measures the average intentions to cooperate by the rest of the group from their 
actual behavior in the previous round. If reciprocity is a factor in the decision, this 
variable should have a positive sign in the estimation, and if players behave with the 




ROUND:    Round number. Accounts for the learning or adaptation processes in each treatment. 
Based on experimental behavior. Opportunistic players should show a decrease in 
cooperation over time, trustworthy players should either increase or maintain 
cooperation. 
FINELAG:   Fine in the previous round. This variable is considered only in the last estimation (REG) 
where the external regulation is introduced, and belongs to the first layer of information 
as it transforms the material payoffs of the game with an expected cost of a penalty. The 
value of the variable is the size of the fine ($100 * (Xi,t-1 ￿ 1)) for those actually 
monitored, and it takes the value zero for those that were not monitored, in the previous 
round. Recall that they learn if are monitored and fined only after they decided their level 
of extraction. Such fine can have an effect in the next round as players may perceive they 
are likely to be fined and suffer a private cost.  
AVCOOPLB:  Average number of days in non-paid labor contributed during last year by the group 
members: a proxy of ￿cooperative￿ behavior in community projects. It was based on the 
anonymous survey filled at the exit of the session. If participants bring elements from 
their context to the lab, and they show differences in contributions to collective-action 
projects, this variable should help explain variations in XDEVIA. 
HHWEALT2:   Player￿s household wealth based on land, livestock, and machinery holdings, valued at 
local prices and adjusted across villages. Based on the survey.  
WLTHDS2A:   Wealth distance = Absolute value of the difference between the player￿s wealth and the 
average of other seven player￿s wealth. Based on the survey. 
WLT_DIS2:    Cross-effect variable = HHWEALT2 * WLTHDS2A.  Accounts for differences in the 
marginal effect of wealth distance for different social (wealth) classes. 
BESTATE:    A dummy = 1 if individual believes that a ￿State￿ organization should manage the local 




coefficient for this variable might show different signs and sizes depending on the 
institution of the experiment, for instance, an external regulation vs. a self-governance 
rule such as face-to-face communication. 
PARTORGS:   Number of community organizations the player belongs to or participates in. Includes 
parents￿ association, cooperatives, water committees, etc. Based on survey. One could 
predict that those belonging to community organizations might show higher willingness 
to cooperate with the others in their group. 
Given that all the experimental decisions were made under the exact same payoff 
structure and experimental environment regarding formal rules about the choice variable 
(￿months in the forest￿), the variables we could consider in the first layer would be the estimated 
intercept, and for the dynamic setting the effect of time (rounds) and of reciprocity. The sample 
size is in each case the number of decisions made during a set of rounds in a stage￿starting at 
round 2 to allow for the dynamic effects￿by all eight players and for all the groups under each 
treatment. Some observations showed missing data on the survey responses, therefore the slight 
differences in sample sizes used in the regressions that follow. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of applying the estimation model using a simple ￿fixed-
effects￿ estimator with an ordinary least-squares procedure. The fixed-effects estimator is a 
stronger test to the simple OLS because of possible effects created within each group, or within 
observations for a single player, which would violate the assumption of independence of 
observations. Individual fixed effects could not be used because of the sample size. Dummies for 
each of the groups were included in each estimation, but their coefficients are not reported. As 
one can expect, some of these dummy coefficients were significant while others were not, 




behavior in the sample. However, we focus here on their role in solving the problem of 
independence of observations in this kind of experimental panel data. 
The summary table of the estimated models is organized first in two major columns for 
each of the two stages: Stage 1 included data for rounds 1 to 9, where all fifteen groups faced a 
baseline treatment with no coordination, communication, or regulation allowed.  In Stage 2 
(rounds 11 to 19), ten groups (COM) faced the possibility of a face-to-face group discussion, 
while five groups (REG) faced the externally imposed and imperfectly monitored regulation. 
Table 1--Fixed-effects with OLS estimation to explain deviations from the Nash selfish 
strategy as a function of the layers of information in Figure 1. P-values for Ho: 
coeff=0 under coefficients. 
Dependent Variable: Deviation from the Nash 
Strategy￿A Measure of Cooperation 
  Stage 1:  
Rounds (2 to 9) 
Stage 2: 
Rounds (12 to 19) 
 Label  Variable  No-COMREG  COM  REG 
Material Payoffs Game:        
 Intercept  INTERCEP  4.5314  7.1965  13.4518 
     0.000  0.000  0.000 
  Avg reduction by other 7 players DELTAVG7 0.3916  0.2472  0.3710 
     0.000  0.002  0.014 
 Learning  ROUND  0.0015  -0.0549 -0.4233 
     0.965  0.102  0.000 
  Fine in previous round  FINELAG  --- ---  -0.0001 
        0.935 
Group-Context Layer:       
  Avg. labor contributions by group  AVCOOPLB 0.0401  0.0838  -0.1497 
     0.488  0.200  0.054 
 Wealth  distance  WLTHDS2A 0.1154  -1.6521 -1.8326 
     0.712  0.000  0.001 
 Wealth*Wealth  Distance  WLT_DIS2  -0.051  0.5371  0.5630 
     0.963  0.000  0.005 
Identity Layer:       
 Individual￿s  Wealth  HHWEALT2 -.0784  -1.0181 -0.5625 
     0.710  0.000  0.117 
  1 if "State should solve problem" BESTATE 0.0612  -1.1979  0.5301 
     0.762  0.000  0.087 
  No. organizations participates in  PARTORGS -0.1391  -0.1646  -0.7158 
     0.133  0.110  0.000 
          
Fixed Effects (No. dummies)    15 groups   10 groups   5 groups  
          
 Sample  size  N  856  677  340 
 R2  adjusted  ADJR2  10.64%  18.67% 49.45% 




(P-Value) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
The estimation results yield some light on how information from the three layers helps to 
explain the variation across groups and across players that otherwise could not be explained by 
the material incentives of the game within treatments. Recall that each group of eight people 
consisted of members of the same village.  Therefore, a prior history existed of experience, 
reputation, beliefs, and other factors that determine their willingness to cooperate with the other 
seven people in their group. The significance and signs of many of these variables show how 
these affect behavior in the experiment. 
Let us turn to some of the most relevant statistical results from these estimations. 
With respect to the first level￿where we account for the static and dynamic effects of the 
material payoffs game￿we observe that reciprocity, expressed in the positive and significant 
sign of DELTAVG7, is confirmed for both treatments, COM and REG, and during both stages 1 
and 2. A reduction (increase) in extraction by other players is followed by a reduction (increase) 
in one￿s own extraction. The effect is slightly stronger (negative reciprocity) in the regulation 
treatment, as a result of players being more responsive to average increases by the rest in the 
group. Negative reciprocity, caused by the external regulation, is what seems to crowd-out the 
intrinsic motivation not to choose their best Nash response that seemed to exist prior to the 
introduction of the external rule. The slightly larger coefficient for DELTAVG7 in the second 
stage for REG shows that in this case each player was, on average, increasing their deviation 
from the Nash best response (in ￿months in the forest￿) by 0.3710 units for each unit change in 
the average of the rest of the group. This erosion of cooperation in the REG treatment is also 
shown by the negative and significant sign of the ROUND variable, compared to the COM 




institution sustained cooperation over time, other things held constant. These results strongly 
reject the free-riding hypothesis that predicts that as the other players reduce their ￿months in the 
forest,￿ the ith player should increase their ￿months￿ and personal earnings. 
Laury and Holt (forthcoming), focusing on the decay or sustained rate of cooperation in 
linear public goods, test a non-linear public goods setting, which in fact is much closer to our 
experimental design of a common-pool resource, and observe as we find here, that the rate of 
cooperation in the base line treatment (first ten rounds) was constant and therefore the 
coefficients of ROUND during this first stage or during the communication stage were close to 
zero, if compared with the regulation treatment.  
Other literature could also explain the rates of cooperation based on variables other than 
reciprocity, e.g., risk sharing and altruism (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). It is certainly a major 
factor that gift-giving among members plays a fundamental role in the maintaining of social 
networks and the provision of public goods they provide. Our model here, however, does not 
technically reflect cooperative actions as gifts since this is not a zero-sum game. Choosing to 
reduce the number of months can, in fact, produce higher private payoffs if others in the group 
act similarly. The fact that DELTAVG7 shows a significant and positive sign confirms that 
players were responding reciprocally to the average play of the others in the group regardless of 
the treatment, and not necessarily that they were being altruistic in their decisions. 
The result of the coefficient FINELAG deserves some attention, as it is statistically 
insignificant and close to zero. The statistical interpretation is simple. Players who were fined in 
the previous round were not responsive to such an incentive in the following period when 
compared to those not monitored. Notice that the probability in t-1 and t of being monitored is 




increase or decrease in their extraction in the next round. Some in fact increased their extraction, 
maybe expecting a much smaller chance of being monitored, while others reduced their 
extraction. Recall, however, that these same samples of REG players were on average responsive 
to the mean extraction of their group members in the previous round. This illustrates the weak 
effect of external regulation, but the stronger effect of reciprocity. 
The estimated coefficients for the next layers of information provide some support for the 
argument that people also bring some of the information they have about themselves and others 
into the game. Regarding the context of the game and the group, we tested two sets of variables. 
On the one hand, AVCOOPLB measures the average level of actual labor contributions by the 
group members to community projects. Notice that during the second stage, this variable showed 
a negative and significant coefficient in the case of the REG groups. This suggests that groups 
that, on average, had a prior history of contributing more labor to community projects decreased 
their deviation from the Nash prediction; however, such effect was not significant for the case of 
the communication groups (COM), and overall positive and significant during the first stage. 
Those players with higher levels of actual wealth (HHWEALT2) and wider wealth 
distance to the other players in the group (WLTHDS2A) seemed less willing to cooperate.  This 
is consistent with the findings of Sally (2001), who suggests that sympathy￿a key factor in 
cooperation￿is a direct inverse function of physical and psychological distance between a 
person and others. The explanations emerge from a combination of ￿experience￿ in similar 
situations and the context of the group in which each player participates, particularly in terms of 
social distance. On the other hand, wealth itself can determine cooperative behavior in an 




homogeneous groups, and groups made of players who depend more on similar collective-action 
situations because of material poverty, show significantly higher levels of average cooperation. 
Notice that BESTATE has opposite signs for the COM and REG data-sets, suggesting 
that under the external regulation, ￿state believers￿ will proportionally comply more with the 
rule, but cooperate less under the non-binding, face-to-face communication environment.  Those 
who responded in the survey that a non-state solution was preferred for this type of problem 
showed higher levels of cooperation in the COM treatment, but lower in the REG treatment. In 
the meantime, notice that for PARTORGS the signs are negative in both cases, which would be 
counterintuitive. However, they are much larger and significant for the REG environment, which 
would be consistent with the effect of BESTATE and AVCOOPLB. ￿Natural cooperators￿ in the 
field under an experimental ￿external regulation￿ environment were less prone to comply with 
the externally imposed rule. We tested other demographic variables for the individuals, but they 
showed no results that were significantly better estimators than these, including￿as one 
reviewer suggested￿the individual value for labor contributed to projects (i.e., individual value 
of AVCOOBLB). 
It is worth adding some comments on the fact that during the first rounds of the game, 
except for the reciprocity DELTAVG7 variable, no other variable shows any relevance in 
explaining variation in behavior, although the overall model does seem significant (see F-test at 
the bottom of the table). Our interpretation is that given the institution of no communication 
allowed among players (in fact, they were sitting facing outwards in a circle) and the learning 
necessary in the early rounds to understand the structure of the incentives, these factors could not 




4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
  We have tested the proposed framework of the layers of information (material 
incentives, group context, and individual characteristics) that people may use when facing these 
games through a common-pool resource experiment in the field, and have used information not 
only about the experiment incentives but also about the actual context and persona information 
of the players. A possible transformation of material payoffs into an internal subjective game 
through the use of information about themselves, their group members, and the incentives of the 
repeated game may induce cooperative behavior as a rational strategy in games with material 
payoff structures of a social dilemma.   
  The framework that we have presented provides some initial guidance in 
organizing the multiple types of variables that appear to affect individual decision making when 
facing these dilemmas of cooperation.  Depending on the context that individuals face, they may 
dig ever deeper into a set of layers of information that are relevant to their decisions, e.g., 
whether the game is ongoing, if group communication is possible, and whether the others and 
their attributes are known to the players. 
  The field experiments we report on here allowed the subjects to use information 
from their own context and for researchers to examine the impact of this information on 
decisions.  We found positive support for the arguments derived from our framework.  It does 
appear that individuals use diverse layers of information depending on the structure of a game 
and the context within which they are playing that game.  
  The use of experimental methods was enriched by having taken the lab into the 
field and invite actual users of natural resources to participate. This methodological approach, 
combined with survey data about the demographic and socioeconomic conditions of each   32
  
particular participant and their group, has allowed us to enrich the experimental information and 
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APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Instructions for Common-Pool Resource experiment reported in Cardenas and 
Ostrom ￿WHAT DO PEOPLE BRING INTO THE GAME?￿  
Experiment instructions (English translation). 
These instructions were originally written in Spanish and translated from the final 
version used in the field work. The instructions were read to the participants from this 
script below by the same person during all sessions. The participants could interrupt and 
ask questions at any time. 
Whenever the following type of text and font e.g. [...MONITOR: distribute 
PAYOFFS TABLE to participants...] is found below, it refers to specific instructions to 
the monitor at that specific point, when in italics, these are notes added to clarify issues to 
the reader. Neither of these were read to participants. Where the word ￿poster￿ appears, it 
refers to a set of posters we printed in very large format with the payoffs table, forms, and 
the three examples described in the instructions. These posters were hanged in a wall near 
to the participants￿ desks and where the 8 people could see them easily. 




We want to thank every one here for attending the call, and specially thank the 
field practitioner _____ (name of the contact person in that community), and _____ (local 
organization that helped in the logistics) who made this possible. We should spend about 
two hours between explaining the exercise, playing it and finishing with a short survey at 
the exit. So, let us get started. 
The following exercise is a different and entertaining way of participating actively 
in a project about the economic decisions of individuals. Besides participating in the 
exercise, and being able to earn some prizes and some cash, you will participate in a 




resources. During the day of the workshop we will give you the earnings you make 
during the game. Besides a basic ￿show-up￿ prize for signing up and participate 
(examples: flash lamps, machetes, school kits, home tools), you will receive a cash bonus 
that will be converted into cash for purchases for your family. The funds to cover these 
expenditures have been donated by various organizations that support this study among 
which we have the Instituto Humboldt, el Fondo Mundial para la Protecci￿n de la 





This exercise attempts to recreate a situation where a group of families must make 
decisions about how to use the resources of, for instance, a forest, a water source, a 
mangrove, a fishery, or any other case where communities use a natural resource. In the 
case of this community ______ (name of the specific village), an example would be the 
use of firewood or logging in the ______ (name of an actual local commons area in that 
village) zone. You have been selected to participate in a group of 8 people among those 
that signed up for playing. The game in which you will participate now is different from 
the ones others have already played in this community, thus, the comments that you may 
have heard from others do not apply necessarily to this game. You will play for several 
rounds equivalent, for instance, to years or harvest seasons. At the end of the game you 
will be able to earn some prizes in kind and cash. The cash prizes will depend on the 
quantity of points that you accumulate after several rounds. 
The PAYOFFS TABLE 
To be able to play you will receive a PAYOFFS TABLE equal to the one shown 
in the poster. [...MONITOR: show PAYOFFS TABLE in poster and distribute 
PAYOFFS TABLE to participants...] 
This table contains all the information that you need to make your decision in 
each round of the game. The numbers that are inside the table correspond to points (or 
pesos) that you would earn in each round. The only thing that each of you has to decide 
in each round is the number of MONTHS that you want to allocate EXTRACTING THE 
FOREST (in the columns from 0 to 8). 
To play in each round you must write your decision number between 0 and 8 in a 
yellow GAME CARD like the one I am about to show you. [...MONITOR: show yellow 
GAME CARDS and show in the poster...] It is very important that we keep in mind that 
the decisions are absolutely individual, that is, that the numbers we write in the game 
card are private and that we do not have to show them to the rest of members of the group 
if we do not want to. The monitor will collect the 8 cards from all participants, and will 
add the total of months that the group decided to use extracting the forest. When the 
monitor announces the group total, each of you will be able to calculate the points that 
you earned in the round. Let us explain this with an example. 
In this game we assume that each player has available a maximum of 8 MONTHS 
to work each year extracting a resource like firewood or logs. In reality this number could 
be larger or smaller but for purposes of our game we will assume 8 as maximum. In the 
PAYOFFS TABLE this corresponds to the columns from 0 to 8. Each of you must decide 
from 0 to 8 in each round. But to be able to know how many points you earned, you need 
to know the decisions that the rest in the group made. That is why the monitor will 
announce in each round the total for the group. For instance, if you decide to use 2 
months in the forest and the rest of the group together, add to 20 months in the forest, you 




[...MONITOR: show poster with the THREE EXAMPLES...] 
Let us look how the game works in each round. 
The DECISIONS FORM 
To play each participant will receive one green DECISIONS FORM like the one 
shown in the poster in the wall. We will explain how to use this sheet. [...MONITOR: 
show the DECISIONS FORM in the poster and distribute the DECISIONS FORMS...] 
With the same examples, let us see how to use this DECISIONS FORM. Suppose 
that you decided to play 5 in this round. In the yellow GAME CARD you should write 5. 
Also you must write this number in the first column A of the decisions form. The monitor 
will collect the 8 yellow cards and will add the total of the group. Suppose that the total 
added 26 months. Thus, we write 26 in the column B of the decisions form. 
[...MONITOR: In the poster, write the same example numbers in the respective cells...] 
To calculate the third column (C), we subtract from the group total, MY 
MONTHS IN THE FOREST and then we obtain THEIR MONTHS IN THE FOREST 
which we write in column C. In our example, 26 - 5 = 21. If we look at the PAYOFFS 
TABLE, when MY MONTHS are 5 and THEIR MONTHS are 21, I earn ____ points. I 
write then this number in the column D of the DECISIONS FORM. 
It is very important to clarify that nobody, except for the monitor, will be able to 
know the number that each of you decide in each round. The only thing announced in 
public is the group total, without knowing how each participant in your group played. Let 
us repeat the steps with a new example. [...MONITOR: Repeat with the other two 
examples, writing the numbers in the posters hanging in the wall...] 
It is important repeating that your game decisions and earnings information is 
private. Nobody in your group o outside of it will be able to know how many points you 
earned or your decisions during rounds. We hope these examples help you understand 
how the game works, and how to make your decisions to allocate your MONTHS in each 
round of the game. If at this moment you have any question about how to earn points in 
the game, please raise your hand and let us know.  [...MONITOR: pause to resolve 
questions...] 
It is very important that while we explain the rules of the game you do not engage 
in conversations with other people in your group. If there are no further questions about 








Preparing for playing: 
Now write down your player number in the green DECISIONS FORM. Write 
also the place _______ and the current date and time __/__/__, __:__am/pm. In the 
following poster we summarize for you the steps to follow to play in each round. Please 
raise your hand if you have a question.  [MONITOR: Read the steps to them from 
the poster] 
Before we start, and once all players have understood the game completely, the 
monitor will announce one additional rule for this group. To start the first round of the 
game we will organize the seats and desks in a circle where each of you face outwards. 
The monitor will collect in each round your yellow game cards. Finally, to get ready to 
play the game, please let us know if you have difficulties reading or writing numbers and 
one of the monitors will seat next to you and assist you with these. Also, please keep in 
mind that from now on no conversation or statements should be made by you during the 
game unless you are allowed to. We will have first a few rounds of practice that will 
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COMMUNITY RESOURCES GAME 
(Summary Instructions) 
 
Objective of the game: To earn as much points as possible at the end of the 
rounds, which will be converted into cash prizes for your household. 
How is it played: In each round, you must decide how many months in a year 
between 0 and 8, you want to devote to extract resources from a forest. The points you 
earn in each round depend on your decision and the decisions by the rest of the group, 
according to the PAYOFFS TABLE (blue table). 
What do you need: To play you need a blue PAYOFFS TABLE, a green 
DECISIONS FORM, and several yellow GAME CARDS. Also you need a player 
number. 
Steps to play in each round: 
Using the blue PAYOFFS TABLE, decide how many MONTHS IN THE 
FOREST you will play. 
In the DECISIONS FORM write your decision (MY MONTHS IN THE 
FOREST) in Column A for the round being played at that moment. 
In a yellow GAME CARD write the round number, and your decision MY 
MONTHS IN THE FOREST. Make sure it corresponds to the DECISIONS FORM. Hand 
the yellow game card to the monitor 
Wait for the Monitor to calculate the total from all the cards in the group. The 
Monitor will announce the TOTAL GROUP MONTHS. 
In the green DECISIONS FORM write this total in Column B (TOTAL GROUP 
MONTHS IN THE FOREST). 
In the green DECISIONS FORM calculate Column C (THEIR MONTHS IN 
THE FOREST) equals to Column B minus Column A. 
In the green DECISIONS FORM write in Column D the total points you earned 
for this round. To know how many points you made, use the PAYOFFS TABLE and 
columns A and C (MY MONTHS and THEIR MONTHS). We will also calculate this 
quantity with the yellow cards to verify. 





Rule A: THERE IS NO COMMUNICATION WITHIN THE GROUP 
Besides the rules described in the instructions that we just explained, there is an additional rule 
for the participants in this group: 
 
You will not be able to communicate with any member of your group before, 
during or after you make your individual decision in each round. Please do 
not make any comment to another participant or to the group in general. 




Rule B: COMMUNICATION WITH MEMBERS OF THE GROUP 
Besides the rules described in the instructions that we just explained, there is an additional rule 
for the participants in this group: 
 
Please make a circle or sit around a table with the rest of your group. Before 
making your decision in each round, you will be able to have an open 
discussion of maximum 5 minutes with the members of your group. You will 
be able to discuss the game and its rules in any fashion, except you cannot 
use any promise or threat or transfer points. Simply an open discussion. 
The rest of the rules hold. 
 
We will let you know when the 5 minutes have ended. Then you will suspend 
the conversation and should make your individual decision for the next round. 
These decisions will still be private and individual as in the past rounds and 







Rule C: EXTERNAL REGULATION 
Besides the rules described in the instructions that we just explained, there is an additional rule 
for the participants in this group: 
 
This new rule is for making everyone obtain the maximum points possible for the 
group. Let us try to guarantee that each player in your group plays 1 MONTH IN THE 
FOREST. If a player were to play more than one month we will impose a penalty for 
each additional month he plays in the forest. 
 
However, it would be very difficult to inspect all members of a community. Thus, we 
will select one of you randomly in your group. Only those selected will have to show 
(to the monitor only) how manyt MONTHS IN THE FOREST they decided to play. 
 
For instance, suppose that the penalty is 500 points for each additional month. If a 
player is selected randomly, and he had played 3 MONTHS IN THE FOREST, the 
monitor will subtract 1,000 points from her total points earned in that round. 
 
The monitor will now announce how many points the penalty will be for each month 







   MY MONTHS IN THE FOREST 
  0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8    
0 619 670 719 767 813 856 896 933 967 0
1 619 669 717 764 809 851 890 926 959 1
2 617 667 714 760 804 845 883 918 950 2
3 615 664 711 756 798 838 875 909 940 3
4 613 660 706 750 792 831 867 900 929 4
5 609 656 701 744 784 822 857 889 917 5
6 605 651 695 737 776 813 847 877 905 6
7 600 645 688 729 767 803 836 865 891 7
8 595 638 680 720 757 792 824 852 877 8
9 588 631 672 711 747 780 811 838 862 9
10 581 623 663 700 735 768 797 823 846 10
11 573 614 653 689 723 755 783 808 830 11
12 565 605 642 678 711 741 768 792 813 12
13 556 594 631 665 697 726 752 775 795 13
14 546 583 619 652 683 711 736 758 776 14
15 536 572 606 638 668 695 719 739 757 15
16 525 560 593 624 653 678 701 721 737 16
17 513 547 579 609 636 661 683 701 717 17
18 501 534 565 594 620 643 664 681 696 18
19 488 520 550 578 603 625 645 661 674 19
20 475 506 535 561 585 606 625 640 653 20
21 461 491 519 544 567 587 605 619 630 21
22 447 476 502 527 548 567 584 597 608 22
23 433 460 485 509 529 547 563 575 585 23
24 418 444 468 490 510 527 541 553 561 24
25 402 428 451 472 490 506 520 530 538 25
26 387 411 433 453 470 485 498 507 514 26
27 371 394 415 434 450 464 476 484 490 27
28 355 377 396 414 430 443 453 461 466 28
29 338 359 378 395 409 421 431 438 442 29
30 322 341 359 375 389 400 409 415 418 30
31 305 324 341 355 368 378 386 392 394 31
32 288 306 322 336 347 357 364 368 371 32
33 272 288 303 316 327 335 341 345 347 33
34 255 270 284 296 306 314 319 323 324 34
35 238 253 266 277 286 293 297 300 300 35
36 221 235 247 257 265 272 276 278 278 36
37 205 218 229 238 245 251 254 256 255 37
38 189 200 211 219 226 231 233 234 233 38
39 173 184 193 201 206 211 213 213 212 39
40 157 167 175 182 188 191 193 193 191 40
41 142 151 159 165 169 172 174 173 171 41
42 127 135 142 148 152 154 155 154 152 42
43 113 120 126 131 134 136 137 136 133 43
44 99 106 111 115 118 119 119 118 115 44
45 86 92 96 100 102 103 103 101 99 45
46 73 78 82 86 87 88 88 86 83 46
47 61 66 69 72 73 74 73 71 68 47
48 51 54 57 59 60 61 60 58 55 48
49 40 44 46 48 49 48 47 45 43 49
50 31 34 36 37 38 37 36 34 32 50
51 23 25 27 28 28 28 27 25 23 51
52 16 18 19 20 20 19 18 17 15 52
53 10 12 12 13 13 12 11 10 8 53
54 6 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 4 54
55 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 55
56 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 56
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